The Severodvinsk used an older OK-650 series reactor. First, the incorporation of a fourth-generation KTP-6 monoblock reactor which does not have separate steam generators likely accounts for a 1.6-metre length difference between the missile compartment and the stern. In addition to a reduction in berthing spaces between the sail and missile compartment, two other design features have likely driven the size reduction. The sail length of the Yasen-M actually exceeds that of the Yasen by a small margin.

Imagery analysis of the boat conducted by the authors and other analysts suggests that the primary differences between the two submarines are in the bow-to-sail and sail-to-missile compartment. This is consistent with the Kazan having a smaller crew than the Severodvinsk. Part of the reason for this is a reported four-metre reduction in berthing spaces on the vessel. The Yasen-M is about nine metres shorter than its predecessor. This will likely necessitate a change in how NATO manages the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) challenge in the High North, given that a strategy of barrier defence at the GIUK (Greenland–Iceland–UK) gap may actually do little to impact Russian submarines, which may have little need to traverse this barrier in order to achieve their operational ends. Long-range strike missions appear to be superseding sea lines of communication (SLOC) interdiction as a primary task. The shift from SSNs like the Akula, which are primarily optimised for a hunter-killer role, towards a concept closer to nuclear guided missile submarines (SSGNs), is likely indicative of a shift in the way that Russian submarines will contribute to future campaigns. As such, we might expect future submarines in this class to enter the fleet at a more rapid pace than previously envisioned.įrom a planning standpoint, the most notable feature of the Kazan – one which it shares with the Severodvinsk – is its capacity to launch a range of anti-ship and land attack missiles, including the hypersonic 3M22 Zircon. However, the design of the Kazan also evinces a number of evolutionary steps that should allow Russia to cut unit construction costs and build times for future vessels in the class. The slow pace of the latter project was in large part due to the financial troubles which beset Russia in the immediate post-Soviet era. The Kazan was constructed in eight years, less than half the time taken to construct the Severodvinsk. Nonetheless, the two boats share a number of characteristics, including a reported level of quietness comparable to the very best Western SSNs and a long-range strike capability which exceeds that seen on most Western assets. It also appears to be shorter in length than its predecessor by about nine metres. NOTE : Article cannot be reproduced without written permission of idrw.The Russian Yasen-M-class nuclear cruise missile submarine (SSGN) Kazan was constructed to a shorter build time than the lead boat Severodvinsk. K-322 Kashalot submarine is presently undergoing medium repair and deep modernization at the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center and her overhaul will see a refurbished hull, modernization and fitment of Indian communication systems and sensors that were expected to be finished in 2024 with sea trials and later handover to India by late 2025. Russia decommissioned K-322 Kashalot as soon deal with India was signed earlier in 2019 and is speculated to be the Akula class submarine that is on offer to India as Chakra III.

K-152 (Chakra II) which was on lease to India from 20 was returned 1 year earlier due to issues with the maintenance of the nuclear reactor. In 2019, India leased an Akula Class Nuclear attack submarine for 10 years from Russia for a sum of $3 billion with the transfer to India happening by end of 2025 or 2026 might be postponed to late 2027 due to the present security situation in Europe and the possibility of the further escalation of the Ukraine war.

Russian attack akula class submarine